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The war in Afghanistan can still be won. There, we have said it.  Let us begin by answering the skeptics’ 
question: what does “victory” mean?  Victory is defined by Afghanistan becoming a territorial entity from 
which terrorists cannot gain sufficient safe haven to organize, train, equip, and launch attacks against the 
USA and its allies.  This means the Taliban must be denied the opportunity to return to unchecked power 
in Afghanistan.  If the Taliban return to unilateral power, sooner or later Afghan soil will again be used by 
al Qaeda or similar violent radicals to strike the both the West and neighboring South Asian states.  The 
pre-9.11.01 status quo will have been recreated and the last ten years will be wasted.  This must not 
happen.  Although we are sympathetic to those who define “victory” as meaning democracy, human 
rights, and other western liberal notions of individual and economic freedom, our definition of strategic 
victory does not require these things.
Now we are going to explain how to win by presenting an operational level plan called “Go” that will help 
the Afghan government maintain enduring control over key nodes in the geo-political space.  Doing so 
will set the conditions for the eventual evolution of a viable Afghan state.  Again, the goal of this plan is 
to deny terrorists the ability to launch 9.11-like attacks from Afghanistan after most US troops leave the 
country in 2014.  We are not offering a new grand strategy; however, we are offering focus and 
synchronization to create optimal synergy for the approach that is now working, Village Stability 
Operations.  The benefits include: a reduction of US resources, the elimination of terrorist basing, and 
mitigating the loss of US prestige if the war is judged as lost.  Our approach does not require a new 
"surge" of forces or a delay in the present draw down.  However, as occurred in the wake of the last time 
the United States witnessed a surprise attack in1941, our plan may require that some US personnel remain 
deployed to the theater for a long time.
After 10 years in Afghanistan, America stands at a critical historic juncture.  We believe re-energizing the 
allied Village Stability approach is important because it is the best approach on which to build a clear plan 
for victory.  Some people may think that the primary American interest is simply to get out of Afghanistan 
as quickly as politically possible, and hope that things turn out.  We agree that hope is a good thing, but it 
is a poor strategy.  If indeed the intent is only to withdraw, without also trying to win, then we believe 
most combat operations should stop, and all personnel should work to reduce risk by focusing almost 
unilaterally on force protection.  Of course doing this would mean leaving our Afghan allies to fend for 
themselves.  Doing so would enhance instability in South Asia and foment further unrest by violent 
radicals in a nuclear-armed Pakistan.  Additionally, an immediate pullout out would mean abandoning the 
initiative that the Village Stability approach has invigorated.  We call a complete and rapid withdrawal a 
"hope without a prayer" strategy, and categorically reject it as being unnecessarily defeatist.  Afghanistan, 
America, and the international coalition can still win.
Although we envision policy makers reading this article and embracing our ideas, our audience is 
primarily those military officers who have deployed or will deploy to Afghanistan in 2013-2014 and in 
who's decisions and actions in the battle space: in VSPs in the villages, in the VSSAs in the district 
centers, AOBs in the provincial capitals, and SOTF's on the FOB's, where the outcome of the war will be 
determined.  Under our plan your job is not to deploy in order to achieve career advancement goals or to 
rotate with minimal casualties to your units.  Your job, your only job, is to win the war.
As such we are speaking directly to Green Beret ODA commanders and their 12 man teams. We are 
speaking to AOB commanders and their company staffs. We are speaking to Special Forces battalion 
commanders, and their equivalents in the Seals, Marines, and all international coalition forces in ISAF. 
 We are talking to officers of the Civil Affairs, MISO, Intel, Logistics, and other branches who are key 
enablers of SOF combat forces.  To higher echelon authorities in theater we say this: understand and 
support the efforts of the front-line ground pounders to execute these operational and tactical innovations 
and you will have helped to win America's longest war.  To all US and allied forces high and low we say: 
if withdraw without winning is your call to arms, then you as individuals and we (the allied countries of 
the coalition) have already lost.
Time to “Go”: Operationalizing VSO by Optimizing VSP’s
The good news is that much of the heavy lifting has been done to set the stage for victory over the 
Taliban.  Over the last three years the United States and its allies have been quietly conducting a 
population-centric approach against the Taliban in the remote rural areas of Afghanistan called VSO, or 
village stability operations, which seeks to earn the trust of the population at the grass roots level.  Unlike 
Iraq, where most of the population lives in towns and cities, the Afghan population is mostly rural, and the 
insurgency thrives outside of the relatively few towns and cities.  The center of gravity in all counter-
insurgencies is the population. In Iraq, that meant cities and towns. In Afghanistan that means the tiny 
villages and extended village networks of commerce and mobility that dominate each valley.  The major 
flaw of the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan two decades ago was that it focused on the cities, thus ceding 
the unchecked mobility of the country-side to the Mujahedeen.  Overall, the US strategy ever since the 
arrival of large numbers of general-purpose forces in 2004 has been all too much like the Soviet’s “inside-
out” approach: focusing too much on demographic concentrations in the cities along the ring road.  VSO, 
correctly, is an “outside in” approach using mostly SOF personnel dispersed to the rural areas.  However, 
the true story of VSO must be told by focusing on VSPs: Village Stability Platforms.  VSP’s are the safe 
houses; the small, fortified compounds; and tiny outposts that ODA team members base from.  This is 
mostly a story about VSPs.
Map 1:  Map of Afghanistan highlighting Uruzgan and Day Kundi Provinces, the AOB’s operational area.
The American public has heard very little about VSO or VSPs, but the truth is the program works and it 
has driven the Taliban out of many parts of the country.  Doing so has robbed the Taliban of manpower, 
legitimacy, money, and key staging areas.  However, we know that VSO has yet to achieve a so-called 
“tipping point” which would make the Taliban’s return to unchecked dominance impossible.  By 
explaining how to optimize VSPs, through the application of a new operational concept called “Go,” we 
are confident that tipping point can be reached by 2014.  We base this claim on factual evidence.  Our 
operational plan has already worked in one area of central Afghanistan that had been dominated by the 
Taliban.  If higher echelon leaders are willing to closely examine what happened in Uruzgan and Day 
Kundi Province from April 2011 to January 2012, we believe the operational plan that achieved success 
there can also be applied successfully to the entire country
In early 2011, Major Thiel received orders to return to 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), assume 
command of Special Forces Company, and deploy to Afghanistan.  Major Thiel’s Special Forces 
Company, labeled an AOB during operations, was tasked to conduct Village Stability Operations in 
Uruzgan and Day Kundi Provinces from April 2011 to January 2012.  Before departing the Naval Post 
Graduate School for the deployment, Thiel began war-gaming in a classroom with the Village Stability 
Platform (VSP) sites plotted on a map.  Dr. Gordon McCormick (who in 1993 co-founded NPS’s famed 
SOLIC curriculum with then Navy Commander William McRaven) observed that the problem set Thiel 
was struggling with required nothing more than a Wei Chi strategy.  In the Wei Chi board game, two 
players alternately place white and black stones on vacant intersections to surround a larger total area and 
capture the opponent stones.  McCormick recommended Thiel read “The Protracted Game: A Wei Chi 
Interpretation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy,” by Scott A. Boorman.  In this moment, largely by 
happenstance, Major Thiel discovered the concept to operationalize VSP success.  He would later fine 
tune the tactical placement of VSPs to achieve the desired operational effect: control the environment and 
deny the Taliban control.
Wei Chi, commonly referred to as “Go” in the United States and Japan, is an ancient strategy game dating 
back to 1086 B.C.  Boorman explains the game and applicability of Go to insurgency or counter 
insurgency: two sides of the same coin (no pun intended) which for the remainder of this article will be 
referred to as the “Special Warfare (SW) environment,” to quote emerging doctrine.  Boorman 
demonstrates how the principles in Go guided the operational art used by Mao Tse-tung to seize control of 
China in the 1940’s.
Ironically, U.S. Special Forces Unconventional Warfare doctrine, (which addresses how to wage an 
insurgency and overthrow an existing government), strongly echoes Mao’s three stage approach for 
guerrilla warfare.  However, Mao’s operational level implementation of Go is glossed over in US 
operational doctrine and goes untouched in critical tactical UW training exercises such as Robin Sage.  Go 
theory resides at the operational level of special warfare.  It can guide a commander on “what to seize” 
and “what to bypass” in order to win the larger war.  Go is reflective of the real-world insurgent 
environment in several ways, specifically:  control, encircle to capture, and sanctuary.
Figure 1:  Intuitively, an onlooker would agree that black controls more of the area than white through 
control of key nodes rather than linear expansion.
CONTROL.  The goal in the game of Go is to attain majority control over the board.  For real world 
Special Warfare applications (operational area); the player with the most area under control is the victor. 
 In the real world, the board space represents the population across a geospatial area, and the intersections 
simply represent villages.  Figure 1 displays a linear expansion plan, white stones; versus the black stone 
plan to maximize control of area and setup positions for surrounding incursions.  On a fundamental level, 
Westerners and Americans think of warfare in linear terms.  Many of our games (for instance American 
football) pit two lines against each other.  As junior officers we are taught using operational graphics in 
the Officer Basic Course that denote battle lines.  However, veterans of the recent wars in Iraq, 
Afghanistan (and Vietnam) can attest that the Special Warfare (insurgent) environment is far from linear; 
insurgents can move across the operational space by posing as unarmed civilians, and counter insurgents 
can drop raiding forces (or VSPs) into any area.  In Figure 1, intuitively an onlooker would agree that 
black controls more area.  Onlookers intuitively know black controls more area because black controls key 
nodes at that stage in the contest.  Players control area by surrounding empty intersections (area) and by 
capturing hostile stones to seize the opponent’s area.
ENCIRCLE TO CAPTURE. 
One way to seize control of more territory and reduce the opponent’s strength is to 
encircle and capture their stones.  A group of one or more stones is captured by occupying every 
surrounding intersection, thus eliminating escape.  Reference Figure 2, black surrounds white at three 
points, if black closes the noose on white by placing a stone on the last adjacent intersect, the white stone 
will be destroyed and eliminated from the board.  A recent and well known historical parallel to 
encirclement in Go is Major General H.R. McMaster’s seizure of Tal Afar, Iraq in 2005.[1]  First, he 
seized the small villages around the city, he then built an earthen berm around the city.  Once the 
insurgents were surrounded and cut off from external supplies and sanctuaries, insurgent control of the 
area was eliminated. Encirclement is an important concept in Go and Special Warfare because it ties into 
deception and conceding small areas to encircle an even larger area.  Stones can avoid capture if they have 
established internal sanctuaries.
SANCTUARY. 
Another readily apparent principle in Go that parallels the Special Warfare 
(insurgent) environment that initially caught our attention was sanctuary.  Students of insurgency are 
keenly aware of the critical operational imperative of sanctuary for insurgencies.  Historically, the two 
dominant insurgent sanctuaries are third country borders or restrictive terrain that inhibits the ability of 
counterinsurgents massing overwhelming combat power.  Sanctuary is an integral part of Go.  Figure 3 
demonstrates the establishment of sanctuary for white.  Black lacks the ability to surround white internally 
and externally, black cannot voluntarily place itself in a capture position in white’s sanctuary.
When introducing Go as a military concept, the common question involves the divergent capabilities and 
tactics of insurgents versus counterinsurgents; the Western mind demands that IEDs, helicopters, and 
fighting vehicles factor into play.  Intersections represent villages in the operational area, and most recent 
veterans will agree that helicopters and fighting vehicles do not win the village.  However, VSPs 
demonstrated that living among and winning the trust of the local population is the essential element of 
control.  Both counterinsurgents and insurgents use an arsenal of similar techniques to establish control: 
medical treatment, intimidation, salaries, civil affairs projects, and propaganda to name a few.  The 
common factor is a grass roots tie (a physical presence), which over long enough period results in control.  
We have no doubt that any Special Forces Detachment (ODA) that remains in a village long enough will 
eventually win the village, be it in two weeks or six months.  Likewise, any village that the Taliban 
occupy will end up under their control.  Unfortunately, there are not enough Detachments for every village 
in an operational area. This brings us back to the core value of Go: a practitioner of Go knows how to 
control the operational area without placing a stone on each intersection.  In Go, you have to learn how to 
position pieces to control more with less.
The Critical Assessment and 12 Key Moves
(Note: this section shifts to first person to recall Major Thiel’s Decisions).
The units under my command were attempting to control two provinces with eight ODAs divided into 12 
Village Stability Platforms (6 -12 man SF teams augmented by 10-20 Infantry and enablers).  Our 
challenge was magnified by a conventional force draw down in our area, from four to two battalions; these 
1,500 conventional troops were focused on the three cities already under Government control, which left 
90% of the operational area and all the concentrations of enemy forces outside of the three cities, to the 
416 men assigned to my AOB.  Additionally, during the last six months, the higher echelon and Afghan 
Commandos were only able to allocate six strike operations to support our VSPs.  In essence, our AOBs 
had to achieve its mission in the absence of significant conventional strike or supporting forces.
The Go concept of occupying key nodes to control large amounts of space seemed valuable, but at first, I 
couldn’t immediately figure out a way to operationalize the key nodes in the real world environment.  I 
tabled the application of Go, but decided to download the Go iPhone application and play for at least five 
minutes a day.  My intent was to shift my West Point-trained linear mindset to an interlaced conflict 
mindset.
Map 2:  AOB Disposition in June 2011
My assessment period, the first 30 days assigned to the AOB, generated an overwhelming feeling that 
many existing VSPs and plans for future VSPs were in the wrong locations.  At this point, the sensation of 
wrongness was not the result of a Go related epiphany.  Rather, the reasons why the VSPs were in their 
current positions sounded weak.  Many of the VSPs were in particular locations due to three reasons: 
terrain valuable based on conventional maneuver warfare; the VSP was established at the furthest extent 
(end) of a clearing operation like a blocking position; or a VSP had been invited into an area by a minority 
or isolated tribe that had reached out to the government or coalition for support (but that minority tribe did 
not represent the overall demographics in the area).  While the reasons for the location of each VSP may 
have been logical at a previous point in time, that time may have passed, and it was clear that the 
disposition of many VSPs in Uruzgan and Day Kundi was ineffective at optimizing VSO in support of an 
overarching provincial plan. 
How did I know this?  In May 2011, only four of twelve VSPs were accessible by ground transport.  
During the first half of 2011, forces assigned to the AOB and the previous AOB had 100+ Afghan 
partners killed, 100+ Afghan partners wounded, and numerous international coalition casualties which 
included Americans.  It was clear to me that the Taliban had achieved isolation of our VSPs.  Isolation 
reflected the fact that security forces were not mutually supporting, and the insurgents controlled the 
mobility of the civilian population.  Most importantly, the insurgents could block or control commerce 
within the provinces.  In essence, my VSPs dominated a space, but the Taliban ruled the Go board in our 
area.
My assessment of the VSP locations highlighted that coalition forces mislabeled Village Stability 
Operations.  Village Stability, embedding in rural villages, was an approach, a method, or a tactic.  While 
the point may seem trite, use of the word “operation,” may have deterred higher echelons of command 
from analyzing an applying an operational level art to synergize and maximize the effect of Village 
Stability Platforms.
Two Detachments, one split team in Deh Rawood and one split team in Gizab, revealed a critical aspect of 
the environment: the value of commerce to local Afghans.  In Deh Rawood’s area, Afghan Local Police 
(ALP) in Hesar and citizens in Tangi valleys, were willing to contest the external Taliban insurgents in 
order to retain access to the District Center Bazaar; the village wanted a market to sell their goods and a 
market to buy modern conveniences.  The people of Afghanistan value commerce and prosperity.  The 
same was true in Gizab valley, where, despite the complexity of the 51 different tribes, the ODA’s system 
of ALP checkpoints ensured mobility and commerce to the District Bazaar.
Map 3:  The AOB combined information overlays to identify commerce routes, terrain mobility, insurgent 
templates, and Go principles to identify nodes that are critical to the population, insurgents, and 
government. (Simulated overlay presented on an open source map.)   
The isolation of the VSPs and discovery of the fundamental commerce motivation, led me to the idea of 
charting the movement corridors: both of insurgents and of the local population.  In accordance with Go 
principles, doing so might reveal the key nodes that would increase control over more area (with the same 
number of VSPs).  Various methods of information collection can be used to chart the population’s 
movement corridor in the environment, such as checkpoint data, bazaar interviews, ground analysis, or 
cell phone service charts like those found on internet sites like www.padgadet.com.  The AOB's 
information overlays of Uruzgan and Day Kundi routes illuminated the key nodes for mobility of both 
insurgents and commerce, as seen in Map 3.  This map of population routes was the key piece of 
conceptual information needed to apply the principles of Go by moving VSP’s into optimal positions to 
break the link between the population and the Taliban as well as establishing a link between our isolated 
VSP security pockets.  By doing so we were about to operationalize Go, and reverse the Taliban’s 
advantage.  As a result, synergistic effects could emanate from our newly placed security pockets.
Over the coming months, the AOB conjured a plan to move, or enable task saturated VSPs, to control the 
key nodes in the province.  This plan involved eleven VSP position decisions based on the principles of 
Go war-gaming and all source analysis, which the majority of ODAs also assessed as appropriate.  The 
moves were managed through an AOB synchronization matrix which allowed the AOB to surge Civil 
Affairs, MISO, Infantry squads, ANASF ODAs, and AOB elements to support ODA plans and the VSP 
adjustments.  Each adjustment is summarized in the following short abstract.
1. Future VSP Tangi Valley Canceled:  The split team ODA was scheduled to occupy future VSP Tangi 
valley, east of Deh Rawood District Center, in the summer of 2011.  The commerce map revealed that 
Tangi valley was a road to nowhere and not on a critical line of commerce.  Additionally, interviews 
indicated that locals were willing to not pay taxes to the Taliban and began traveling freely to the district 
market.  The VSP was canceled and the ODA visited the area once or twice a month. 
2. VSP Kuni Kotal Closed:  VSP Kuni Kotal was located at the southern end of the Tagaw valley, 
completely isolated from ground resupply due to IEDs, and the village had a small population.  VSP Kuni 
Kotal was originally established because Kuni Kotal was the village at the end of the valley during a 
clearing operation and the ground had dominant high ground over-watching the road to Kajaki.  The 
commerce route revealed that the population and Taliban were using two alternate routes to bypass the 
VSP and maintain control over the key population center north of the VSP, Tagaw Village.  The VSP was 
clearly in the wrong place; thus, the VSP was closed and VSP Tagaw was opened.
3. VSP Tagaw Opened:  Based on the commerce overlay, which was confirmed by interviews with 
merchants, we moved the VSP 19 kilometers to the north.  19 kilometers, or 12 miles, was the difference 
between isolation of a VSP with no ALP, and what would later emerge as the securing of the southern 
Tagaw Valley.  The ODA recruited ALP, opened the valley, enabled the closure of a VSP to the North, 
began movement of elders to the district shura, and linked the valley to the Deh Rawood and Shahidi 
Hasas district markets.  The markets are key.
4. Future VSP Chenartu Canceled:  The AOB received a eighth ODA during the deployment, which 
was templated to embed in Chenartu Village on the route to the isolated ODA in Khas Uruzgan district.  
The commerce route illuminated to routes to the district; most importantly, the heat map did not reveal 
insurgent nodes north or south of the route.  It appeared the route had few villages and thereby little 
population.  Apparently, the Taliban, who also have limited resources, viewed the area as not worth 
controlling.  The AOB deployed select personnel, embedded with an Australian Recon patrol, to visit the 
only major population concentration on the route, Chenartu Village.  Upon arrival, a 250 man militia 
supported by the Provincial Chief of Police was discovered.  The future VSP was cancelled and assets 
were refocused to another heat map concentration to determine the location of insurgents operating in 
northern Khas Uruzgan.
5. VSP Yakdan and VSSA Tinsley Reinforced:  VSP Yakdan and Village Stability Support Area 
(VSSA) Tinsley were located on heavy commerce concentrations and while the ODAs did not have access 
to the North, the population to the North was significant and directly connected to the insurgent dominated 
district of Baghran, Helmand Province to the West.  Analysis indicated that Baghran was the main origin 
of insurgent support entering Uruzgan and Day Kundi Provinces.  The ODA intended for future VSP 
Chenartu was redirected to Tinsley, thereby allowing both VSP Yakdan and VSSA Tinsley to operate with 
full ODAs.
6. VSP Nili Transitioned to a Civil Affairs:  VSP Nili was located at the Day Kundi Province capital of 
Nili.  Nili was devoid of violence, largely due to the homogenous Hezaran population, which was pro-
coalition.  Maintaining a governance and development tie to the capital was important, specifically to the 
regional commander; consequently, general purpose forces sent a civil affairs team to relieve our split 
team.  AOB focus in Day Kundi shifted to the Detachment in the Kajran District and the indicators of 
insurgent passing through southeast Day Kundi, North of the ODA in Khas Uruzgan district. 
7. Future VSP Northern Khas Uruzgan Recommended:  The AOB would have considered a future 
VSP in Northern Khas Uruzgan District/Southeast Day Kundi to disrupt the insurgent flow of materials 
into central Uruzgan, specifically into the Karmisan and Kush Khadir valleys.  This would have required 
an additional ODA or authorization to split an ODA. 
8. Recommended VSP Kajran move to District Center:  VSP Kajran was embedded in the middle of a 
small minority tribe, the Balauchi, in the midst of larger Pashtun and Hezaran groups.  The VSP was in the 
Balauchi area, thus other tribes viewed them as Balauchi.  The VSP was in the farthest possible position 
from Taliban in the west, and was an hour from the district center.  The ODA and AOB recommended a 
move from the legacy VSP site to the district center; the follow-on ODA initiated the move after we 
departed.
NOTE: The most significant impact of the Go application came in the following four VSP decisions.  The 
basic process, according to Major Thiel, is encompassed in the following,
“We overlaid a commerce route map, the VSPs disposition, population concentrations, and the enemy 
controlled areas.  The combined overlay revealed routes and key nodes that we wanted to take from the 
enemy and the nodes we wanted to take or reinforce to increase mobility and commerce.  We couldn’t 
reinforce everyone.  Central to our plan was rather than reinforce Hesar or Tinsley, we wanted to 
encircle the areas and reduce insurgent access to insurgent sanctuary in the Baghran District of Helmand 
Province.  The selection of the key routes and nodes was based on the understanding I gained from 
playing Go, what to seize and what to surrender in order to control the whole area (board).”
9. VSP Hesar Reinforcement Canceled:  Higher echelons wanted split ODAs consolidated and had 
earmarked the Hesar Detachment to consolidate in the isolated Hesar valley VSP.  Hesar valley and the 
Char Chineh valley to the north were contested areas; however, the Company elected not to use the linear, 
reinforcement approach.  Go concepts in conjunction with the heat maps revealing mobility indicated that 
seizing the Khod Valley, three valleys away, would degrade the insurgent access to their sanctuary in 
Baghran and encircle the contested areas.  Seizing the Khod would cause Hesar to evaporate and Taliban 
in Char Chineh would be degraded. 
Map 4:  AOB Disposition in February 2012.
In sequence like dominos, the Go based plan played out: Khod was seized, attacks in Hesar dropped, a key 
leader in Hesar reintegrated and brought in key ALP, VSP Hesar was transitioned to Afghan National 
Police mentorship, and the valley remains connected to the district market.  Rather than reinforce in linear 
style, seizure of the Khod valley degraded the enemy strength in multiple valleys. 
10. VSP Khod Opened:  After seizing the Khod valley, Afghan National Police ANP forces were 
scheduled to hold the valley with 200 men for six months.  The ANP arrived with 60 men for 45 days and 
would not progress past the southern foothold in the valley.  Due to the value of the valley in the Go based 
operational framework, The AOB occupied two sites for 45 days until an ODA could be repositioned from 
VSP Saraw to open a new VSP in Khod.
11. VSP Saraw Transitioned:  The combined overlay revealed that VSP Saraw was on a critical 
commerce link; however, at that time insurgent movement corridors linking the village to the insurgent 
areas to the west were not heavily developed.  VSPs Yakdan and Tagaw were disrupting most significant 
routes into the valley; thus, the VSP was transitioned into logistics hub for the AOB logistics and support 
operations.  One infantry squad, one Air Force CCT, and one Green Beret occupied the site; they were 
uncontested in the last four months of our tour.
Overall the plan focused on gaining control of Western Uruzgan and Southwest Day Kundi, which 
allowed the Afghan Army and National Police to move forces to open routes to east side of the province.  
Many of the 11 decisions centered on the tactical surrendering Hesar and Saraw while seizing Khod, thus 
isolating/encircling the western portion of the Uruzgan.
A reader may be asking, “so what ?  You have not shown me a formula or checklist by which to arrange 
VSPs.  You have not even shown me how to play Go, which you assert helps arrange VSPs.  You have 
stated that learning how to maximize your control of the operational requires learning Go to internalize the 
concepts; however, I want something tangible, now!”  These thoughts are understandable for an officer in 
the hectic throes of preparing to deploy or already in theater.  Thus, a quick roadmap to maximizing VSP 
effects involves the following:
1.    Assess VSP locations by asking the following questions:
a.     How/why did this VSP end up in this location?  The answers, conventional terrain value, 
blocking position, minority tribe request, or special interest of a key leader, should all be red flags.
b.     What contribution is this VSP making to the big picture, adjacent valleys or overall area?  
First and foremost it should be increasing commerce for the population.  It should be increasing 
village to district and district to province commercial ties.  It should enable security force mutual 
support, and degrade insurgent support, communication, and recruiting bases.
2.    Analyze the Routes:
a.     What are the preferred population routes for commerce?
b.     What routes link insurgents to a sanctuary?
c.      What routes create synergy for security forces and the government, where the sum is greater 
than the parts?
3.    Close or Transition VSPs:
a.     Cut your losses in low impact locations (e.g. see above decision #2. Kuni Kotal).
b.     Before departing an area, attempt to tie ALP to ANP management, which increases 
government legitimacy.
c.      Ask what the life cycle of each VSP looks like?  Has the area become semi-permissive and a 
Civil Affairs Team may be more appropriate than an ODA, (as an example).
4.    Move and Open VSPs:
a.     New VSPs should disrupt enemy sanctuary and improve commerce.
b.     Is the population in a village or valley big enough to build 400 ALP?
5.    Periodically reassess:  Students of Go will attest that the key nodes constantly evolve based on where 
each side moves.  The enemy has a vote too.
Measuring Success
How do we know that Major Thiel’s story regarding use of the concepts of Go actually resulted in 
measurable success?  In a period that corresponded with a 50% reduction in conventional forces, and the 
subsequent allocation of only one strike mission per month in support of the 12 VSP sites, this AOB’s 
area was transformed.  If one thinks in terms of the GO concepts of control, sanctuary, and capture, the 
data are both encouraging and clear:
1. All but one VSP became accessible by ground by the end of the deployment.  At the beginning of the 
deployment, only 4 of 12 VSPs in the two provinces could be driven to without significant probability of 
IED attack or Taliban ambush.  The eight isolated VSPs were limited to air support for logistics and 
mobility.  There are never enough air assets.  As a result, the Taliban not only controlled the Go space, 
they were able to freely move into and out of their sanctuary.  They were not able to capture the entire 
provinces of Uruzgan and Day Kundi, but they were “leading the game” as they waited for allied forces to 
withdraw.  However, at the end of the AOB’s deployment only one VSP was isolated and vehicles could 
traverse the remaining VSPs with minimal chance of IED attack or ambush.  This freedom of movement 
indicated that the AOB had reversed the Taliban’s control, dried up much of their sanctuary, and removed 
the threat of immediate capture as conventional forces drew down.
2. SIGACTs, significant kinetic events, dropped by 75% compared to the same periods one year prior.  In 
the statistics that support this fact, a SIGACT was a kinetic action between insurgents and village security 
forces, such as: IEDs, mortar attacks, and small arms fire.  The reduction of SIGACTs by 75% equates to 
saving many lives.  Moving VSPs and taking key areas can cost dearly, but waiting to be attacked in the 
VSP or IED’d on the roads is just as dangerous.  Fighting to seize the key nodes drops SIGACTs, 
decreases insurgent capability, and saved lives in the long run.  Reduction of SIGACTs increases the 
legitimacy of the Afghan government in the eyes of the population.  The reduction of one type of 
SIGACT, (IEDs), means that civilians can move freely with less fear of hitting an IED.  The use of IEDs 
is critical to the Taliban’s control of the local population.
3. All politics are local.  The AOB did not try to convince the locals that in terms of moral codes of Islam, 
the current Afghan government’s way was superior to that of the Taliban.  What the AOB did is ask the 
simple question: What do you want?  The answer, time and time again was “I want to get my corn to 
market.” “I want to be able to buy almonds at the market in the next valley to feed my kids happy.”  “I 
want stuff for my family.”  Simply put, they wanted freedom of movement (mobility), to become 
prosperous, and they were willing to create the security forces need to open the commercial routes, and 
keep them free of Taliban infestation.
During this AOB’s deployment, the numbers of Afghan Local Police (ALP) leapt from 1200 to over 2000. 
 This rapid growth in ALP force structure represents an outpouring of support by local authorities, and 
belief that siding with the Afghan government and the coalition was more advantageous that siding with 
the Taliban.  Key villages like Khod witnessed the transformation of one jingle truck of supplies a month 
during Taliban control, to five trucks a month after the AOBs seizure of the valley.  The detachment 
commander’s discussions with local elders revealed that establishing and maintain commerce links is 
paramount in local Afghan decision-making.  After the key commerce nodes were identified and seized 
(using Go experience to determine “what to seize” and “what to surrender”), these mobility routes became 
valuable to the Afghans.  Places like Hesar and Tangi show that even after the Americans have left, ALP 
can continue to maintain access to the district bazaar.  Afghans do not want the Taliban to tax them, to tell 
them if they can arrive or depart, and to tell them what they can buy or sell.  Following the seizure of 
Khod Valley in the west and the reinforcement VSPs in central Uruzgan, the AOB sustained zero coalition 
casualties for the final four months of the rotation.
Subsequently, the follow-on AOB sustained one minor wound on their eight-month tour.  This AOB did 
not solve all the problems in its two provinces, but its commanders did become students of “Go” 
operational principles, and in doing so discovered a method to optimize VSP disposition.  We believe it is 
a model for success that must be considered as 2014 approaches. Afghan forces can learn this approach.
Conclusion: Go to Win
How can America hope to maintain influence Afghanistan with only a fraction of the 68,000 troops now 
in the country?  We suggest it can be done by applying improved operational art to the Village Stability 
approach using the guiding principles of the ancient Chinese game of Go.  Go breathes life into the time-
honored military axiom: economy of force is a key to strategic success.  Based on the success of VSPs and 
their proven ability to each build and command 400 ALP, the Western coalition could maintain a powerful 
force (if measured by control rather than numbers of troops) in rural Afghanistan.  By making this happen 
in 2013-2014 (and beyond) the USA would remain dedicated to the “outside in” approach that is now 
working.  VSPs also would continue to enable the Afghan government to increase legitimate connections 
at the village level.
However, if the coalition chooses to consolidate its forces on major bases along the ring road,[2] and 
attempts a Soviet-style hub and spoke concept during the drawdown, the result will be the same: defeat.  
Taking this approach would signal an abandonment of Go principles.   Doing so would be a departure of 
the existing “outside in” approach to Village Stability, and a return to the “inside out” concept that not 
only failed the Soviets in the 1980s, but also failed the coalition during the first half of the present Afghan 
war.  Village stability works because of dispersed VSPs; we are certain a return to “village visitation” will 
not bring victory.  The strength of the Taliban is in the rural areas.  They can only be defeated there.
We conclude by saying this.  The optimal positioning of VSPs requires the application of operational art 
by AOB and SOTF levels of command who understand Go.  This art must be taught and transferred to 
Afghan forces. Most importantly, Major Thiel’s AOB experience highlights the need to assess the current 
location of each VSP.  Thiel's fusion of Go principles to mobility analysis revealed a method to guide the 
operational array of VSPs.   The dedicated study and understanding of Go concepts will provide guidance 
for evolving VSP disposition.  VSPs can be decisive and they have seized the initiative from the Taliban 
across Afghanistan.  However, in their present spatial distribution, the VSPs have not yet attained a 
“tipping point” in Afghanistan.  The Taliban retain too much sanctuary and maintain too much mobility.  
They await 2014 to begin the piece-meal securing of the key nodes across the entire country.  However, if, 
after careful study, VSPs are optimally repositioned to dominate the key nodes of commercial and 
population mobility in the rural areas, transition to local forces takes place, and more VSPs are created, 
victory by the Government of Afghanistan, the USA and its allies is still possible.
This article has highlighted just a few of Go’s key elements that make the game applicable to the Special 
Warfare environment.  The next step is for those of you deployed or about to deploy to play the game 
repeatedly in order to re-orient your western linear mindset and internalize Go thinking.
Like learning to balance on a bicycle, Go is a heuristic learning tool, and the only way to learn is to play.  
Go’s limitations to provide an exact, repeatable, “equation” for victory are consistent with the operational 
term “art.”  The game is available on-line for free, and can be played on a mobile phone.  The concepts, 
when integrated with intelligence overlays, specifically those associated with Afghan commerce, will 
enable the most effective disposition of VSPs.  Don’t deploy to Afghanistan to do another rotation.  Go to 
end it.
Glossary of Acronyms
ALP.  Afghan Local Police.
ANASF.  Afghan National Army Special Forces.
AOB.  Advanced Operational Base (Special Forces Company).
AOR.  Area of Responsibility.
GPF.  General Purpose Forces (American, non- SOF).
IED.  Improvised Explosive Device.
ISAF.  International Security Assistance Force (NATO and other coalition forces).
MISO.  Military Information Support Operations (US Army, previously PSYOP).
ODB.  Operational Detachment Bravo.  An SF Company.
SEAL.  Sea Air and Land (US Navy commandos).
SF.  Special Forces (US Army Green Berets).
SOF. Special Operations Forces (all services and branches).
SOLIC. Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.
VSO.  Village Stability Operations
VSP.  Village Stability Platforms
VSSA.  Village Stability Staging Area
[1] See George Packer, “Letter from Iraq: The Lesson  of Tal Afar.” The New Yorker. 10 April 2006.
[2] See for instance David G. Fivecoat, “Leaving the Graveyard: The Soviet Union’s Withdrawal from 
Afghanistan.” Parameters, Summer 2012, pp. 42-55.  Lt Col Fivecoat argues that the Soviet withdrawal 
was well planned and executed, and suggests it could serve as a model for the US withdrawal.  We agree 
that the Soviet withdrawal was a finely executed, but think without a rural-based operational plan, the 
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